

26 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with NSC Staff (9/14/79) re Strategic Force Policy
and Crisis Warning ☐

1. ☐ invited ☐ to his office to discuss the NSC Staff interest in C³I. MGEN Rosenberg and COL William Odum were also present from the NSC Staff. The item of primary interest to the NSC representatives turned out to be Strategic Force policy. Joel raised the subject of warning and handling of crises toward the end of the meeting, to get the NSC view of the substance of a previous meeting with Mr. Lehman (Attachment 1). ☐

2. Strategic Force Policy

a. The NSC Staff argued strongly the merits of enhancing strategic deterrence and war fighting potential through strategic flexibility: mobile targeting, reconstituting of forces for repeated attack, and survivability. Rosenberg described a 1977 visit by Mr. Brzezinski to SAC at which he (Brzezinski) was appalled to learn that Strategic Force Policy and capability were quite inflexible. He wants to induce change. Rosenberg complained that DoD had not taken seriously Brzezinski's memo to them in June 1978 on this subject. He gave Joel a copy of a recent follow-on memo to DoD (August 1979) which spelled out more clearly their objectives for a more survivable enduring C³I, with considerable emphasis on the problem of NCA vulnerability. Rosenberg asked Joel to see that the DCI got a copy, since he should be strongly involved in the effort. (A subsequent discussion between the DCI and Brzezinski confirmed this interest on their part.)

b. GEN Rosenberg inquired about a previous meeting, which he had apparently prompted, between Joel and RADM Butts (Dan Murphy's Deputy). Joel said that Butts had expressed concern that the PAO contractual efforts on Task #3 (Strategic Forces) might not be well coordinated with ongoing DoD efforts and could be premature. Joel indicated that Butts was going to set up a meeting next week to expose to PAO the ongoing DoD efforts, and that he would continue working with RADM Butts to ensure that the two efforts were supportive. The NSC Staff seemed to be seeking assurances from Joel that the PAO STOF report on Strategic Forces and the planned contractor

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efforts to follow would provide the kind of information needed to develop a plan for achieving an enduring C³I. Joel assured them that the PAO efforts were intended to examine the impact on the NFIP of the various ways this could plausibly be done. []

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3. Crisis Warning

a. Joel summarized the Navy STOF report, PAO follow-on work in I&W, and the meeting with Mr. Lehman. [] reaction seemed impromptu (he seemed surprised by this agenda item), but he was unequivocal. Referring to the DCI's role in crisis and war, he said that the DCI had failed to capitalize on previous initiatives (e.g., PRM 11) which ultimately led to Executive Order 12036. He said that the DCI had made adversaries of natural allies (e.g., Brzezinski, Brown) and might have expected that the Executive Order would not resolve the turf questions associated with the DCI's roles vis-a-vis SECDEF. Moreover, [] contended that the NSC would do nothing further on the subject unless the DCI and SECDEF surfaced the issue. Even then, he was not sure that the NSC could undertake a solution to the problem this late in the current administration. []

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b. GEN Rosenberg said that Deputy SECDEF Duncan had written to the NSC in the Spring of 1978, suggesting that outdated memos of agreement between the SECDEF and the DCI (1950's vintage) were in need of revision. Rosenberg said that in June 1978, Duncan had been told to work out a revision with the DCI but that he had heard nothing further on it. He suggested that we look into the status of the memo. (Subsequent inquiries with the NIO for Warning and the DCI's personal staff have failed to produce any evidence that Duncan had pursued this.) []

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c. Joel returned to the point raised in the Navy STOF report, that some Navy forces have often been placed in vulnerable face-to-face situations in past crises. He asked whether the NSC recognized the Navy's problem and the usefulness of more effective crisis management in addressing this problem. [] conceded that a few Navy units might be "written off" but that most would not be in imminent danger. He was not persuaded that the Navy's dilemma was cause for action at the NSC level. []

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
4. The bottom line of the meeting was unmistakable:

- The DCI support (perhaps even leadership) is wanted in developing an enduring C³I capability (see Attachment 2, a recent MFR concerning a DCI meeting with Brzezinski on survivability in limited nuclear warfare).

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-- The DCI's role in crisis and war is a dead issue for now, unless the DCI and the SECDEF agree that it should be resurrected. A major effort by PAO for the remainder of the Presidential term would have to be regarded as an investment in understanding how a DCI (and his staff) could support the next administration in warning and crisis management. 


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Attachments:

1. Memo for the Record dtd 12 Sept 79
2. Memo for the Record dtd 20 Sept 79

Distribution:

- 1 - EA/D/DCI/RM
- 1 - CDR  PAO
- 1 - D/PAO
- 1 - Subj File
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12 September 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the NIO for Warning on 7 September 1979 re Navy STOF Follow-on Work in I&W

1. [redacted] and the undersigned met with Mr. Richard Lehman and [redacted] (Assistant NIO) pursuant to our request for an exchange of views on I&W. Our objectives were:

a. to apprise Mr. Lehman of Navy STOF conclusions regarding warning and to get his reactions,

b. to offer our assistance in providing a response to the HPSCI request for a report on overall I&W effectiveness, due 31 December 1979. [redacted]

2. Joel explained that we seek ways to enhance the I&W process through improved crisis forecasting and effective interaction between the intelligence community and the NCA in crisis management. Mr. Lehman was sympathetic but concluded that significant improvement is impossible unless:

a. the JCS and SECDEF show more willingness to share contingency plans and military information with the DCI in crises,

b. the NCA defines a role for the DCI in wartime (hence in crises that could lead to war); i.e., unless the NCA explicitly involves the DCI in crisis management. [redacted]

3. Mr. Lehman does not think the DCI will use the HPSCI request as a forum to raise old political issues. Accordingly, Mr. Lehman tends to prepare a pro forma report of I&W progress during his tenure as a response to the HPSCI. He did not ask for our help in this limited effort; although he did state that some office in the community should be responsible for conducting post mortems, as OPEI used to do. [redacted]

INTERVIEWED BY [redacted]
AND METHODS INVOLVED [redacted]

DERIVATIVE CL [redacted]
DECL & REVW ON 30 Aug 1985
DERIVED FROM Multiple

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SUBJECT: Meeting with NIO for Warning on 7 September 1979 re Navy
STOF Follow-on Work in I&W

4. Joel said that he intends to meet with [] of the NSC to determine whether there is a will at the NCA level to promote change. Mr. Lehman did not object, but holds little hope for significant progress. We came away from the meeting with the impression that solutions to I&W problems lie well above our pay grade. If the Earmarth meeting does not change that impression, our continued study of I&W effectiveness could become an exercise in futility. []

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PAO [] (12 Sep 79)

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20 September 1979


MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski,
19 September 1979

1. On 10 August, Dr. Brzezinski sent a memo to Secretary Brown requesting more attention to survivable command control communications and intelligence. He claims that somebody in our organization received a copy of this. He believes we should participate in this activity (!). I told him I thought we should have the lead on the intelligence part of it. The objective is to determine whether we should be affording more survivability for possible limited nuclear warfare. He is concerned of overreliance on the concept of mutual assured destruction. He is concerned that, while the Soviet strategic force buildup may primarily be for diplomatic leverage, it is possible that in fact they would find themselves in a corner and decide to apply it in a limited way.

Ask CT to get on to this one; see who in Defense is handling it and what they need for an input on the survivability of intelligence collectors.

15(b) Dr. Brzezinski indicated he'd recommended to the President if there is any increase in Defense funding as a result of the Cuban fiasco (or perhaps as a result of the 3%/5% issue though that wasn't clear), we should also have an increase for intelligence. I thanked him.


STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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